I. INTRODUCTION
Tax evasion is both costly to the government and complicated to combat.
1 Even noncompliance by individuals with the federal income tax consists of a number of distinct problems, 2 though for ease of analysis, most of it can be grouped into three general categories: 3 (1) failure to file a required tax return 4 (filing noncompliance), 5 (2) failure to in determining tax compliance. 17 They have looked to such things as taxpayer morale, 18 trust in government, 19 and the use of tax compliance as a signal. 20 In fact, this simple comparison of relatively high rates of voluntary compliance rates with relatively low audit rates and penalties is flawed because it does not account for the role of information reporting and withholding in constraining the opportunity to evade tax. 21 Withholding essentially puts third parties in charge of paying the taxpayer's taxes to the IRS 22 and eases the psychological burden that would be associated with writing a check for the full year's taxes to send in with the tax (Aug. 2002) , at http://papers.ssrn.com/ so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=341380 (empirical analysis in their paper "offers a perspective seldom taken into consideration with regard to the issue of tax compliance: Deterrence is only one of the motivational forces in getting people to pay their taxes. Quite another is the set of policies available to the tax authority to bolster taxpayers' morale.").
19 359 (1990) ("A general conclusion from the large amount of research on deterrence effects is that deterrence factors generally evidence weaker effects than do normative orientations and expectations of significant others . . . . Most studies, however, have not controlled for the subjective importance of the decisions or such situational factors as structural opportunity that may affect the fullness of the analytical decision process.") (citations omitted).
22. Although withholding is very effective, it does not provide a 100% payment rate. Employee withholding can be evaded through submission of incorrect W-4 forms. Employers also sometimes fail to pay over employee withholding to the IRS. See infra text accompanying notes 170-171. Some employers set up systems to facilitate intentional evasion of employment tax responsibilities. See Christopher Bergen, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: "We Will Catch You," (May 11, 2001) , LEXIS, 2001 TNT 94-9. return. 23 Information returning matching can be viewed as an invisible audit-but it is not counted in audit rate statistics. 24 Information reporting also deters noncompliance, 25 as well as facilitating collection of delinquent taxes. 26 Thus, it may not be surprising that "voluntary" compliance 27 rates are much higher for the 23 . John Carroll describes a phenomenon in which taxpayers care primarily about whether they will get a refund with their return or owe more tax. John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers 821, 824 (1991) . Both of these phenomena suggest that taxpayers in a refund position will take less risk (and therefore are less likely to cheat) than taxpayers in a balance due position.
Carroll raises the possibility of expanding the withholding system and paying interest on overwithholding to increase the sense of fairness and encourage people to err on the side that favors the government. Carroll, supra, at 49. However, this raises several concerns. First, the payment of interest might encourage taxpayers to use the federal government as a bank. That could be solved by paying a below-market rate of interest. However, that might even increase the sense of unfairness, by emphasizing the impression that withheld taxes properly belong to the taxpayer rather than to the government. That view might create upward pressure on the interest rate. Second, if interest were paid only on withholding and not on refundable credits such as the earned income credit, the refund would have to be allocated, which might increase the error rate in the interest calculation. Third, the payment of interest might encourage taxpayers to file late. This could be addressed by only paying interest to those who timely file or by cutting interest off at April 15 or a set date after April 15. Finally, at the margin, interest payments might encourage taxpayers to cheat by raising the amount at stake with respect to any taxes saved. However, that effect is not clear because of individual riskaversion with respect to gains. See Spicer, supra, at 18.
24. See Guttman, supra note 16, at 593-94 ("A . . . taxpayer-we'll call him Z-has wage, interest, and dividend income, and a state tax refund from last year. Z also deducts mortgage interest, real property taxes, state income taxes, and some charitable contributions. Since most of those income and deduction items are reported to the IRS by third parties, IRS computers probably will compare the information reported by the third parties with that entered on Z's tax return. If there is no discernable discrepancy, which is usually the case, Z will not hear from the IRS. Although Z might be unaware of this computer-based review, he has essentially been audited.").
25. See AUDIT AND COLLECTION ACTIVITY STATISTICS FOR FISCAL 2000, supra note 16 ("we have an aggressive document-matching program in place to cross-check wages, interest and investment income to make sure people pay the right amount."); Plumley, supra note 5, at 28 (showing that an information return matching program is a strong deterrent of filing noncompliance).
An IRS study of voluntary compliance found that an increase in document matching did not increase reporting compliance. Id. at 36. However, as the study points out, compliance statistics suggest that taxpayers assumed that comprehensive document matching was in place before it actually was, so that an increase in actual matching would not influence reporting. Id.
26. See George Guttman, The Interplay of Enforcement and Voluntary Compliance, 83 TAX NOTES 1683, 1683-84 (1999) (explaining that, in 1998, "the IRS collected more than a billion dollars through letters sent as part of the information returns program.").
27. "Voluntary compliance" is an appealing phrase, because, like the term "customer," it suggests that paying taxes is a choice, though of course it is not. One of my students once said types of income subject to information reporting (many of which also are subject to withholding) than for those that are not. 28 The overall voluntary compliance rate with respect to wage and salary income, for example, is generally estimated to be 95% or greater 29 and for dividends is approximately 94%. 30 By contrast, voluntary compliance with respect to income from self-employment income, which is not subject to information reporting, 31 is estimated at approximately 42% of taxes due. 32 something like, "voluntary compliance is 'voluntary' in the same way volunteer work is-it's not that you don't have to perform, you just don't get paid for it."
28. Tax on income from illegal business may be hardest to collect because of the secretive nature of the activity. The magnitude of this problem is unclear because "tax gap" figures, extrapolated from TCMP audit results, do not include most illegal-source income. See George Guttman, Measuring the Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service, 89 TAX NOTES 1102, 1104 (2000). However, it appears to be substantial. See Martinez, supra, at 555 n.76 (citing ABT ASSOCIATES, UNREPORTED TAXABLE INCOME FROM SELECTED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, 61, 108, 147 (1984) (estimating unreported taxable income in 1982 was $22.15 billion for drugs, $2.39 billion for gambling, and $1.58 billion for prostitution)). Taxpayers engaged in illegal activity have a strong incentive not to report the income from that activity because reporting it may reveal the underlying crime. See id. at 580 ("For some, evasion is a conscious act to avoid detection of illegal activities such as drug sales or money laundering . . . .").
Tax underpayments involving illegal income may be more susceptible to criminal prosecution than other cases because they involve activity that is itself illegal. That is, it may be easier to prove that underreporting was intentional rather than accidental with respect to illegalsource income. However, prosecution for tax evasion may be pointless in most cases in which there is underlying criminal activity for which the taxpayer can be prosecuted. That is, absent an Nonetheless, the constraining techniques of information reporting and withholding and adversarial techniques focused on enforcement probably do not explain all tax compliance. That is, there may be a role for softer, more "cooperative" strategies.
33
There are a variety of possible cooperative strategies but, given the focus of IRS reform, a particularly important question is whether IRS "friendliness"-in the form of increased service, an emphasis on procedural fairness, or a softer tone in communications with taxpayers-can increase voluntary compliance. This is an important question because the revenue from voluntary compliance constitutes approximately 98% of total revenue.
34
Following this Introduction, the article contains two principal parts. First, Part II focuses on IRS reform. Section A of that part briefly discusses the events that led to IRS reform. Section B considers the effect that IRS reform has had on enforcement to date.
Part III of the article examines the critical question of the effect of a kinder, gentler IRS on voluntary compliance. Section A of that Part considers the available evidence of the impact of taxpayer service on tax collection. Section B discusses the relevance of perceptions of procedural fairness. Section C analyzes the role of the tone of communications from a tax collection agency. The article concludes that there is little evidence that greater "customer service" by the IRS or a softer tone that is not sensitive to context will increase compliance, but that it is possible that increased perceived procedural fairness may have a positive effect on compliance.
extraordinary situation in which the underlying criminal activity cannot be proven, but tax evasion can, adding a charge of tax evasion would have little marginal deterrent effect. Moreover, it would have little deterrent effect on other criminals. It would also probably have much less deterrent effect on taxpayers with legal-source income than would criminal prosecution of other taxpayers with legal-source income. See Stefan F. Tucker, ABA Tax Section Suggests Changes to Criminal Investigation Division (Dec. 23, 1998), LEXIS, 1999 TNT 10-32. The IRS study of voluntary compliance found that criminal tax convictions has a significant and positive effect on reporting compliance. See Plumley, supra note 5, at 36. However, that study did not distinguish between criminal tax prosecutions of those with legal-source and those with illegal-source income.
Given the likely lack of deterrent effect of enforcement directed at illegal-source income, it is likely very inefficient for the IRS to pursue the taxes on criminal-source income, except perhaps in isolated cases where the taxpayer has substantial assets. The IRS will get more value from its limited enforcement resources by pursuing other tax evaders.
33. See generally Lederman, supra note 14 (arguing that fostering compliance norms can increase compliance and that enforcement can help sustain those norms).
34. See infra text accompanying note 76 (enforcement revenue constitutes approximately 2% of total revenue collected after refunds).
II. The Connection Between IRS Reform and Tax Compliance

A. Why Reform the IRS?
There are a number of possible (and overlapping) concerns about any tax collection agency: (1) its efficiency, which may implicate things such as its use of technology; (2) the skills of its workforce, which may reflect issues such as the adequacy of training; (3) possible abuses of power by employees; and (4) the image of the agency, which is sometimes said to affect voluntary compliance. The federal government, including Charles Rossotti, who was Commissioner of the IRS from November 1997 to November 2002, 35 has focused on all of these issues. 36 However, IRS reform specifically stems from a variety of problems that Congress and taxpayers experienced beginning in the early 1990s.
First, the IRS poorly implemented a computer upgrading project at a cost of $4 billion dollars, after Congress appropriated funds for that purpose. 37 Second, the General Accounting Office issued numerous reports criticizing a variety of aspects of IRS performance. 38 Third, taxpayers complained about difficulties in reaching the IRS by telephone, rude treatment by IRS personnel, and the intrusiveness of the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), the in-depth audit the IRS used as a compliance tool. 39 In 1995, Congress established a commission to consider restructuring the IRS.
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In 1997, the commission made several recommendations, including restructuring Congressional oversight of the IRS, providing the IRS with a Board of Directors, updating the IRS's technology, requiring the IRS to develop a strategic plan for increasing electronic filing of tax returns, increasing taxpayers' ability to recover damages in appropriate cases, and simplification of the tax law. The principal charge that Congress gave the IRS was to reorganize and become more "customer"-friendly. 50 The restructuring ranged from the symbolic, such as a changed mission statement 51 that does not mention the collection of taxes, 52 to an expensive overhaul of the entire organizational structure. The overhaul involved a change from a geography-focused organization to one based on taxpayer segments.
53
We saw current and former IRS agents who had to testify in secret because they feared for their lives. We saw ordinary citizens, taxpayers, who talked about how an audit turned their entire lives upside down, with some of them suffering great financial loss that will never be recovered. We saw a government agency totally out of control, lacking accountability, an agency where one is guilty until proven innocent.
We saw and heard all this and we acted to put a stop to it. We enacted sweeping reforms of the IRS to make it more efficient and taxpayer friendly, and we provided critical new protections for the American taxpayer to make the IRS more accountable. In a sense, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act put the IRS on probation. 51. The new mission statement is: "Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all." I.R.M. § 1.1.1.1(1). The old one read: "The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve the public by continually improving the quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner warranting the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity and fairness." Policy Statement P- To assist in achieving its new mission, the IRS has developed three strategic goals. The first goal is to provide top quality service to each taxpayer. The second goal is to provide top quality service to all taxpayers. The third goal is to increase productivity within the IRS by providing IRS employees with a quality work environment. The IRS describes the process of change necessary to meet its strategic goals and fulfill its mission statement as "modernization."
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
53. RRA '98, supra note 9, § 1001(a). Other provisions assist taxpayers in contesting asserted liabilities. These include a section providing for the possibility of a shift of the burden of proof to the IRS in litigated tax cases, 61 a more widely applicable set of rules for "innocent spouse" relief from joint and several liability, 62 an authorization of $6 million in matching funds for lowincome taxpayer clinics (since increased to $7 million), 63 and cessation of both interest and certain time-sensitive penalties in cases in which the IRS does not send notice of the proposed liability within 12 or 18 months, 64 despite the periods of three years and longer contained in the statute of limitations on assessment.
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Following RRA '98, the IRS shifted substantial resources from enforcement to taxpayer service, partly by not rehiring in enforcement for attrition, and partly by detailing enforcement personnel to taxpayer service. 66 In fiscal year 2000, the detailing of personnel to customer service reduced examination programs by 605 staff years. 67 In fiscal any extensions), unless such failure is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect; (9) willful understatement of Federal tax liability, unless such understatement is due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect; and (10) threatening to audit a taxpayer for the purpose of extracting personal gain or benefit.
Id. The IRS has "requested that the unauthorized inspection of returns or return information be added to the list of violations." JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 61. I.R.C. § 7491; RRA '98, supra note 9, at § 3001(a). : year 2001, the number of professional staff in audit and field collection was about 21% lower than a pre-1987 buildup in that staff.
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B. The Impact of IRS Reform on Enforced Compliance
Not surprisingly, the post-RRA '98 reallocation of resources resulted in (or at least coincided with) a significant decline in enforcement activity. Audit rates continued a decline that had begun before RRA '98 became law. '98. They are also not particularly informative. 74 More informative than a short-term decline in enforcement activity is its effect on revenue collected; liens, levies, and seizures are only the tools, not the results. After RRA '98 was enacted, enforcement revenue declined somewhat, as the chart below illustrates. 75 Yet total revenue increased (in absolute terms). 76 Thus, enforcement revenue steadily declined as a percentage of total revenue until 2001. Overall, the data indicates that RRA '98 decreased enforcement, at least temporarily, which is not surprising. Congress did not manifest particular concern with compliance when it focused on reforming the IRS to be more service-oriented and respectful of taxpayer rights, and, given limited resources, an increase in service is likely to result in a decrease in enforcement. Yet, despite the press reports about the dramatic drop in liens, levies, and seizures, RRA '98 has not been a disaster for absolute enforcement revenue.
Of course, the revenue figures above do not reveal what percent of available revenue the IRS actually is collecting and whether that percent 80 . See TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66 ("In general, the amount of unpaid taxes identified by these compliance programs did not decline as much as the number of cases closed. In two of the six compliance programs, the amount of unpaid taxes identified increased. The data available to us do not make clear the extent to which this increase may represent a change in the type of cases worked, increased levels of noncompliance by taxpayers, or other factors, including inflation."). has declined. 82 Immediately following RRA '98, there was a dramatic increase in the number of delinquent accounts that the IRS did not pursue:
The IRS has . . . sent cases of delinquent taxpayers to an inactive file with increasing regularity. In 1999, the IRS sent 668,018 cases to the inactive file as compared to just 98 in 1998. Sending these cases (a sizeable percentage of the three million cases from 1999) to the inactive file had the practical effect of writing off $2.5 billion in taxes owed to Treasury. 83 More specifically, the data for 1998 through 2001 are as follows: In 1999, the IRS instituted a new priority system that generally assigned priorities to more recent cases, those with higher delinquent 82. Cf. Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance: Preliminary Empirical Results (Nov. 14, 2002), LEXIS, 2002 TNT 224-22 ("Our latest projection of the gross tax gap (the amount of tax imposed by law that is not paid voluntarily and timely) was on the order of $275 billion for all income and employment taxes in 1998. This was over 15% of the tax due. Of that amount, we estimate that only $50 billion will eventually be collected through enforcement and other late payments."). amounts, to taxpayers who contacted the IRS about their delinquencies, and to employment tax over income tax. 85 In addition, the new system provides for periodic review of the cases and setting aside of those of a certain age that have been passed over for more recent cases. 86 Thus, former Commissioner Rossotti stated that the IRS has shifted its focus to the "most productive cases." 87 The new system achieved its goals in that the median amount owed by the taxpayers for whom collection action was deferred was about $4,500, compared with $5,500 for other delinquent taxpayers in the collection population. Also, the taxpayers for whom collection action was deferred tended to have been delinquent for a longer period of time-about an estimated 5.6 years versus an estimated 3.9 years.
88
While positive, this achievement should be considered in the larger context of the possible revenue the IRS did not have the resources to pursue:
[B]y the end of fiscal year 2001, after the deferral policy had been in place for about two and one-half years, IRS had deferred collection action on the tax debts of an estimated 1.3 million taxpayers. We also estimate that these 1.3 million taxpayers owed about $16.1 billion in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties that originated from assessments by all six compliance programs. By fiscal year 2001, IRS was deferring collection action on tax debts at a rate equal to one of three new delinquencies assigned to the collection programs. 89 Thus, although enforcement revenue did not decrease dramatically between 1998 and 2001, it appears that the portion of identified 85 . TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66, at ¶ 35. 86. Id. Those cases are labeled "not collectible" but the taxpayers involved continue to get notices and to have any refunds seized to offset their balances due. Id. The IRS is entitled to reopen those cases, so long as the statute of limitations on collections has not expired, but in practice will not do so unless "(1) . . . the taxpayer becomes delinquent again or if IRS receives information indicating that the taxpayer had additional assets that could help pay off the delinquency and (2) . . . IRS finds the resources to work" those cases. Id.
87. Letter from Charles O. Rossotti to James R. White, included as Appendix II of TAX ADMINISTRATION REPORT, supra note 66, at ¶ 91 ("Your report indicates that although there has been a 28% decline in direct staff time there was only a 7% drop in dollars collected. This is a result of our continuing efforts to provide focus to the most productive cases in our inventory. We are hopeful that this focus as well as our reengineering efforts will help improve productivity and reverse some of the declines.").
88. Id. at ¶ 38 (footnotes omitted). 89. Id. at ¶ 37 (footnotes omitted).
delinquencies that the IRS pursued and collected decreased and the magnitude of uncollected delinquencies grew substantially. This paints a bleaker picture of the short-term effect of RRA '98 on enforcement than does collections alone. 90 Of course, the key question for the federal fisc is the likely effect of a change in enforcement activity or results on voluntary compliance. The next Part considers the possible impact on voluntary compliance of the IRS's shift in focus to a more "customer"-oriented organization following RRA '98.
III. THE ROLE OF A KINDER, GENTLER IRS
What role does a reformed, "friendlier" IRS play in a tax compliance strategy? Do taxpayers respond differently to a service-oriented IRS or to a softer tone in IRS enforcement?
Some IRS officials 91 and others 92 apparently hold the view that a friendlier IRS is better for compliance.
Theoretically, greater responsiveness to taxpayers may support greater tax collection, just not through enforcement.
93 Kent Smith has argued that:
90. "The IRS attributes its inability fully to pursue enforcement cases to the modernization effort, a decrease in staff, reassignment of collection employees to support customer service activities, and additional staff time needed to implement certain taxpayer protections that were included in the IRS Reform Act." JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
91. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 4, at 36-37 (" [T] here is disagreement within the IRS on how to ensure voluntary compliance. Should the IRS threaten taxpayers with enforcement action, or provide better customer service? The pendulum swings back and forth every few years between compliance and customer service, but there is no consensus on how best to proceed."); Lee A. Sheppard, ABA Ponders Where We Go from Here (May 20, 1987), LEXIS, 87 TNT 98-4 ("We're asking ourselves what our role is, and trying to treat taxpayers and practitioners as customers,' said [then-Commissioner Lawrence] Gibbs, recognizing the need for enhanced taxpayer assistance. Public relations and soul searching aside, enforcement of the laws is what keeps people honest. "People are, in the final analysis, going to pay their taxes because they think they'll get caught, and have to pay a penalty," Gibbs observed. So much newly budgeted money and effort will go into enhanced enforcement and examination.").
92. See Jack Teuber, IRS Horror Stories Prompt Hearing on Proposed Taxpayers "Bill of Rights," 35 TAX NOTES 219, 220 (1987) (quoting Senator David Pryor) ("Like a bully, the IRS relies on intimidation and arm twisting to strike fear into the hearts of those it bullies . . . . And they do this in the name of compliance. It is my guess that compliance could be improved not by continuing to browbeat taxpayers, but by reestablishing respect for the IRS in the manner in which it performs a difficult and unpopular task.").
93. Professor Joshua Rosenberg has made this argument, comparing a service-oriented IRS focus to a customer-focused retail store: I began to consider what the IRS might learn from other customer-friendly and successful enterprises. I noted that when I go to Nordstrom's Department stores, an enterprise nationally known for being customer-friendly, an associate is always available and attentive, guiding me, helping me figure out what to select, and ringing up the sale. The customer is encouraged, in a very helpful and friendly way, to buy what the store has to sell . . . .
[r]esponsive service and procedural fairness as positive treatments by tax authorities can have both direct and indirect effects on taxpayers' compliance behavior.
Positive actions by authorities toward taxpayers may be reciprocated by compliant actions on a simple titfor-tat basis, a direct effect on taxpayers' actions that is not mediated by normative or legitimating processes. However, reciprocity also appears to be a basic, normative obligation in many social situations, and positive treatments by authorities may also engender in taxpayers a more general normative commitment to compliance, particularly if the taxpayers believe that the authorities normally and routinely act positively toward taxpayers.
94
As this excerpt suggests, IRS service to taxpayers and procedural fairness are two different but connected concepts. 95 The IRS's "service" role is in helping taxpayers comply with the tax laws.
96
Procedural fairness refers to issues such as due process and equality of treatment.
97
Each may impact compliance by affecting the taxpayer's image of the On the other hand, at some less well-run stores, the customer may be left alone to wait endlessly for assistance. . . . In many ways, our tax collection system has resembled a poorly run retail operation: "customers" typically feel like they have been left on their own to ferret out where to go and what to do. Their available choices often appear unclear and confusing; while attempting to figure out how to do the "right" thing (pay what they owe), they are met with numerous temptations to do wrong (cheat or exaggerate, at least a little). . . . "Sales" (tax revenues, to be exact) are way down, but the customers remain angry at the IRS rather than pleased with their ability to pay less than they should. . . . 97. See id. at 224 (stating that procedural fairness includes the opportunities given taxpayers to tell their side of the story, how fair the IRS is to taxpayers, the correctability of decisions, and how equitably and consistently individuals are treated); see also id. at 231 (listing survey items related to procedural fairness). The "procedural fairness" scale was based on four questions focusing on such things as IRS procedures and practices and the honesty of IRS employees. Id. Smith argues that responsive service by a tax collector is probably a precondition to procedural fairness. Id. at 228. His examination of IRS survey data found that likely to be the case. See id. at 242.
IRS. For the same reasons, the tone of IRS communications also may affect taxpayers' perceptions of the IRS.
98
It seems intuitively plausible that such cooperative techniques as responsive service and procedural fairness might affect tax compliance, but is the argument borne out by empirical evidence? Section A of this Part discusses the available evidence on tax collector service to taxpayers. Section B discusses procedural fairness. Section C considers the tone of letters sent to taxpayers.
A. Service
One of the changes brought about by the process of IRS reform was the now-standard reference to taxpayers as "customers" of the IRS.
99
This nomenclature actually began in the 1980s with then-Commissioner Larry Gibbs 100 as part of a focus on private sector management concepts.
101 Accordingly, the reference to "customers" seems to derive 103. An earlier study that made use of interviews of taxpayers conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. for the IRS, see Smith, supra note 94, at 229, found that "[r]esponsive service has a strong, positive effect on perceptions of procedural fairness, but it has no effects on other variables net those of procedural fairness . . . . In sum, responsive service appears to be a very important factor affecting perceptions of procedural fairness, perhaps almost a precondition; but the effect of these two positive incentives on other variables is entirely through perceptions of procedural fairness." Id. at 242. This study is discussed further below. See infra text accompanying notes 136, 139.
104. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 4 (Apr. 1996), available at number that they could use for assistance with federal as well as state tax returns. 105 Normally, the Minnesota Department of Revenue did not provide assistance with federal taxes. 106 The hours of operation were the same as the hours of operation of the regular help line but represented an increase over prior years. 107 This strategy, unlike certain other strategies tested in the study, 108 had little effect on compliance.
109
The results of the IRS study are consistent with this-that study found that taxpayer phone calls to the help line had no measurable impact on voluntary compliance. 110 In addition, the IRS study found that its speed of issuing refunds, the volume of the Taxpayer Service office's correspondence with taxpayers, and IRS educational outreach efforts all had no measurable effect on voluntary compliance. 111 Furthermore, in Minnesota, taxpayers in a "redesigned form" group received an expanded form (two pages instead of one) that facilitated additions and subtractions on the return without the necessity of referring to the instruction booklet or using worksheets. 112 Only taxpayers who had not used a return preparer for their 1993 tax return were sent the special form. 113 The form was sent to a group consisting of taxpayers who had made an addition or subtraction on their 1993 returns and to a 108. The study found that a letter threatening audit was effective with respect to low-and middleincome taxpayers (approximately 96.7% of the population) and a letter making a norms-based appeal had a modest effect overall and a greater effect on certain subgroups. See id. at 10, 18-19 (reporting results of study); see also Lederman, supra note 14 (discussing the Minnesota study in more detail).
109. Coleman, supra note 104, at 16. There was a possible effect of service on two subgroups in which taxpayers were in the low-risk, low-income category. One of those two groups resulted in a larger increase in income and reported taxes than the control and the other had the opposite effect, approximately canceling each other out. Id. Interestingly, the average refund claimed was larger for this group than for the control group (by $33), which in turn was larger than the average refund claimed by the group that received the norms letter (by $12). Id. at 18.
110. Plumley, supra note 82, at ¶ 18. In fact, "telephone calls that TPS [Taxpayer Service] handles [had] a weakly significant negative impact on income reporting." Plumley, supra note 5, at 37 (emphasis in original).
111. Plumley, supra note 5, at 39. These are strategies that revenue authorities may be inclined to use. For example, as part of a multi-part strategy, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue "engaged in a public education program with the theme that tax evasion is not a victimless crime and that both honest taxpayers and citizens dependent on government services suffer from tax evasion," Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen Mightier than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1314 (1987), as well as "a major customer service program, including user-friendly forms, a vastly improved Taxpayer Assistance Bureau, record fast refunds, and outreach programs . . . ," id.
112. Coleman, supra note 104, at 6-7. 113. Id. at 6.
group consisting of those who had not.
114
The revised form also produced little overall difference in additions, subtractions, or taxes. 115 Similarly, an Australian Centre for Tax System Integrity study that involved sending certain taxpayers with rental property a schedule to complete found that sending the schedule made no difference in the magnitude of deductions claimed where the taxpayers were not required to return the schedule.
116 Thus, at least as measured thus far, increased 114 . Id. 115. Id. at 21. More important with respect to forms may be ensuring that information returns are designed to obtain information that can be matched to taxpayer returns. This is an issue for Schedule K-1, which reports information about "pass throughs" from Subchapter S corporations and partnerships. "The IRS estimates that $1.1 trillion in income goes through passthrough entities. The argument made was that there was a potential burden on small business owners, particularly because the IRS could not always tell from return matching whether or not items had been correctly reported. Bond, supra, at ¶ 6. This area is therefore ripe for improvement of the return-matching process, which may require modification of the reporting process to reflect on the K-1 what will be shown on the taxpayer's return. Senator Kit Bond urged the IRS to help taxpayers report the information from the Schedule K-1 in a manner that will allow the agency to verify its accuracy and enable taxpayers to avoid a matching-error notice in the future. "Ideally, this should be accomplished by modifying Form 1040 so that taxpayers can directly report the information from the Schedule K-1."
The IRS subsequently announced that it would resume the matching program using additional filters during the screening process. 
B. Procedural Fairness
An important focus of RRA '98 was procedural fairness to taxpayers. 117 Professor Eric Posner has argued that taxpayers may use tax compliance as a "signal," that they will cooperate with others. 118 As part of that argument, he has argued that the government can serve as a focal point for that signaling-establishing that tax compliance, not noncompliance, is what good types do-by indicating that the government itself has a low discount rate (that is, a long-term view).
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Accordingly, he has argued that taxpayer rights legislation such as RRA '98 is a way in which the government not only signals its own cooperation but also serves as a focal point for private signaling: 120 Very generous, even wastefully generous, procedures are signals that IRS officials, or their political superiors, belong to the good type. The more wasteful the procedures are, the better. Face-to-face contact, hand-holding, on an experimental study conducted to investigate such effects). This study is discussed further below. See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
117. Procedural fairness encompasses "how much opportunity individuals (or other entities) have to tell their side of the issue, how hard the authorities try to be fair to individuals, how correctable decisions are, and how equitably and consistently individuals are treated." Smith, supra note 95, at 224. RRA '98 included new "collection due process" procedures as well as other provisions focused on fairness. See RRA '98, supra note 9, § 3401 (collection due process); id. § 1203(b) ("ten deadly sins" of IRS employees); id. § § 3000-3804 (Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3).
118. Posner's signaling model imagines a society in which "[e]ach individual periodically matches up with some other individual in order to engage in a 'cooperative relationship.' A cooperative relationship, which may be commercial, social, or intimate, has the structure of a repeated prisoner's dilemma ('PD')." Posner, supra note 17, at 1786. Key to the model is the assumption: that players have different time preferences. "Bad types" have high discount rates, meaning that they value future payoffs relatively little compared to current payoffs. "Good types" have low discount rates. The standard result in the repeated PD model is that a necessary condition of cooperation is that both players have a sufficiently low discount rate. Thus, those who consistently cooperate are more likely to develop reputations for being good types, and those who cheat are more likely to develop reputations for being bad types.
Id. at 1786-87.
Because Posner's model assumes that each individual in the society has private information about his or her own time preference, individuals need a way to convince others that they have a low discount rate, in order to get others to enter relationships with them. "Signals" are costly, observable behaviors that provide no benefit to the signaler other than providing information and therefore are more reliable than cheap talk. Id. at 1787.
119. Id. at 1792. 120. Id. at 1799.
generous rights to appeal, restrictions on the use of confidential records, and other procedures-even, or especially, if tending only to hamper the IRS without giving the taxpayer concrete benefits-create warm feelings of trust in the heart of the taxpaying citizen. These procedures show straightforwardly that the government is willing to sacrifice short-term gains, which can only be true of a government with a low discount rate.
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Professor Posner's signaling argument has been widely criticized, both with respect to tax compliance 122 and more generally. 123 The use of tax compliance as a signal seems particularly unlikely because of the legal protection afforded tax returns and return information 124 and the lack of any norm of disclosing to others in business negotiations, for example, tax returns (let alone the supporting documentation necessary to corroborate the reporting).
125 Given the uselessness of tax compliance as a signal, the government's wastefulness of resources in a demonstration of cooperation with taxpayers should be similarly useless to spur taxpayer "good type" behavior. In contrast to Posner's theory, Kent Smith hypothesized that "[c]itizens . . . are more likely to take their taxpaying obligations seriously if they perceive that the state does also. A primary indicator of the state's interest is its concern with detecting and punishing noncompliance." Smith, supra note 94, at 240 fig. 1 , 241. Smith's analysis of survey data found that a higher belief in the perceived likelihood that small tax cheaters would be caught decreased the normative acceptability of underreporting. Id. at 244 fig. 2 nyone who showed up at a commercial negotiation eager to display his or her latest tax returns would probably be regarded not as a trustworthy business partner but as some kind of freak.").
Yet, the perceived fairness of IRS procedures may affect taxpayer attitudes to the IRS and perhaps thereby affect tax compliance.
126
Professor Posner further argues that we can imagine how government officials would behave if they did not have to send signals. They would presumably raise revenues using the most efficient tax system available. Such a system might not resemble the one we have today, for tax collectors probably would dispense with due process, politeness, and evenhandedness.
More generally, "good tax-collecting behavior" is maintaining confidential information, refraining from threats and intimidation, keeping the tax payment process as simple as possible, and avoiding intrusion as much as possible.
127
In fact, it is unlikely that the government would succeed in dispensing with due process and fairness for very long. Citizens tend to respond to enforcement that they deem overzealous by protesting or rebelling, impeding tax collection. 128 The televised IRS hearings, which included "horror stories" told by taxpayers, 129 are an example of an effort, coordinated by Congress, to enact legislation restricting aspects of tax collection. Although Barzel does not address taxes, the idea in the tax context is that the sovereign, who seeks to maximize his wealth, must strike a balance that will optimize revenue, given the tax system and enforcement costs. Under-enforcement will not produce as much revenue as is possible, as evasion will not be optimally detected or deterred but over-enforcement will result in resistance by taxpayers.
129. See supra notes 44-45, and accompanying text. With respect to areas of law other than tax compliance, Tom Tyler has shown that perceptions of procedural fairness impact compliance, 133 although the impact may be attenuated. 134 Given those findings and evident taxpayer willingness to oppose strongly perceived procedural unfairness on the part of the IRS, it seems likely that procedural fairness may impact tax compliance or at least normative commitments to compliance. 135 Two studies suggest that the latter relationship exists. A study by Kent Smith found evidence that a higher level of perceived procedural fairness correlated with a lower normative acceptability of tax evasion. 136 Similarly, Karyl Kinsey found that hearing from other people reports of unfair treatment by the IRS increased taxpayers' intentions of future noncompliance.
137
To what extent does increased acceptability of tax evasion or the intention not to comply correspond to actual noncompliance? 138 Neither ecause compliance is affected only weakly by legitimacy, which itself is only moderately affected by procedural justice judgments, the procedural justice to compliance causal chain is not strong. The erosion of obedience to law just posited is supported by the data, but it is likely to be a gradual erosion.").
135. Occasionally, an attempt at procedural fairness may have negative side-effects. An example is the "third party contact" provision of RRA '98 that requires the IRS to notify the taxpayer before contacting a third party about the taxpayer's tax liability. I.R.C. § 7602(c); RRA '98, supra note 9, § 3412. As discussed above, the IRS uses information return matching to check compliance. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. Unfortunately, any mismatch between an information return and a taxpayer's return does not tell the IRS whether there is an error on the taxpayer's return. For example, it is possible that the information return is incorrect (such as mistaken in amount). E.g., Portillo v. Comm'r, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1991) (provider of late 1099 form could not substantiate $21,380 of payments allegedly made in cash that the taxpayer denied receiving).
A logical approach for an IRS agent working on a mismatch would be to contact the payor to verify that the payor believes the information reported to be correct. fig. 1 , supra note 23 (discussing and illustrating a "tax schema" that "assumes that personal, social, and legal inhibitors affect a taxpayer's commitment to comply, which in turn affects compliance.").
the Smith study nor the Kinsey study reported a direct relationship between perceived procedural fairness and noncompliance. 139 A study by John Scholz and Mark Lubell using survey data found that greater "trust in government" corresponded to significantly lower self-reported noncompliance. 140 However, that study did not isolate procedural fairness; the two statements used in the studys survey were broad ones from national election surveys ("you can generally trust the government to do what's right" and "dishonesty in government is pretty rare"), 141 The survey was conducted in 1988 and focused on the previous three years. Id. at 402-03. The questions posed did not distinguish between unintentional noncompliance (presumably discovered later) and intentional tax evasion. Id. The questions were framed in terms designed to reduce response bias resulting from the lack of social acceptability of tax evasion. Id. at 402. Thus, the answer choices were "'definitely did (report all income)' through 'probably did' and 'probably did not.' To 'definitely did not'" Id. For the same reason, any answer other than "definitely did" (report honestly) was recorded as noncompliance. Id. The authors "presume" that the survey answers do not reflect unintentional noncompliance. Id. at 403 n.2. However, that is impossible to tell from the data. Cf. Lempert, supra note 139, at 252 (critiquing a similar four-point scale, stating, "I have the nagging feeling that . . . 'probably have not' [omitted even a minor amount of reportable income] is a denial equivalent to 'I am only slightly pregnant'" and pointing out that unintentionally omitted items may be discovered by a taxpayer in the course of preparing a subsequent return and comparing it to the prior one).
The authors also found that the measured level of noncompliance corresponded to a measure from the 1985 TCMP. Scholz & Lubell, supra, at 403 n.2. That measure used as the numerator returns reflecting underreporting less those reflecting overreporting, on the assumption that overreporting is unintentional and unintentional noncompliance is randomly distributed. See id.; Karyl A. Kinsey, foreword to SURVEY DATA ON NONCOMPLIANCE: A COMPENDIUM AND REVIEW, at 1 (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 8716). However, the results of taxpayer surveys suggest that a substantial number of taxpayers intentionally fail to take deductions to which they are entitled. Kinsey, supra, Foreword at 1, 21. In addition, unintentional noncompliance may not be randomly distributed because poor recordkeeping could result in bias toward underreporting. Id. at 6 n.3. Kinsey reports that IRS personnel expressed doubts about the validity of the approach of subtracting returns with overreporting from those with underreporting. Id. Foreword at 2.
141. See Scholz & Lubell, supra note 141, at 404. The discussion of the use of these questions stated, "[t]he heuristic model suggests that trust in government serves as very rough proxy for [sic] ratio of tax costs to public goods benefits that [sic] is so difficult to evaluate for federal income tax."
procedures and decisions 145 -and another set concerned "interpersonal justice,"
146 which refers to "politeness and respect, sensitivity to people's feelings and consideration of their circumstances." 147 The study found that letters reflecting a format focused on procedural fairness had a modest effect on filing compliance with respect to individual taxpayers. 148 However, for entities, "the reference to an interpersonal right tended to have a positive impact, but the combination of informational message and an informational right being made salient was counterproductive."
149 With respect to payment compliance, the study found some evidence that, with respect to individual taxpayers, the informational fairness letter that also referenced principles of informational rights increased compliance, but the opposite was true for entities. 146. Id. at 4 (citing Greenberg, supra note 145). 147. Id. The experiment involved a total of nine different letters because each of the three letter formats (informational justice, interpersonal justice and the standard letter) were matched with three types of content: a reference to either informational or interpersonal fairness principles discussed in Australia's "Taxpayers' Charter" (which "outlines 'the legal rights and standards taxpayers can expect from the Tax Office,'" id. at 4, citing Australian Taxation Office "The Taxpayers' Charter" (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 1997) at 8), or no reference to fairness principles. Id. at 4, 7. Each letter was sent to 500 randomly selected taxpayers that had an overdue "Activity Statement" for the third quarter of 2001. Id. at 2, 6-7. Large companies and taxpayers registered with a tax agent or accountant for Activity Statement purposes were excluded from the samples so as to focus on self-preparers. Id. at 2, 7. In addition, to minimize confusion, the samples were restricted to "(a) clients had only ever had quarterly obligations; (b) clients had no other AS [Activity Statement] outstanding; (c) clients had only one known concurrent AS obligation." Id. at 7. In addition, taxpayers from Western Australia were not included. Id.
148. Id. at 16. Controlling for background difference of taxpayers, such as previous filing compliance history, letter format had "overall, a marginally significant effect, Wald (2) = 4.65, p = .098," and the letter content was not significant. Id. at 14.
149. Id. at 16. 150. Id. at 18, 20. The experiment also tracked telephone calls in response to the letters. With respect to those calls, the study concluded:
The data on return phone calls indicated some advantages of reminder letters that adopted principles of informational fairness. There tended to be fewer return calls overall when the letter message was informationally fair; fewer excuses and fewer requests for delayed lodgment when an informational right was granted; and fewer accusations when an informational letter matched an informational right. However, the effects were not completely clear and rather suggestive.
Id. at 13.
Another Australian study considered the role of social identity; fair treatment by an authority may matter with respect to a group to which both the authority and the affected person belong. 151 That study found that taxpayers' responses to survey questions 152 indicated that two of the four types of tax compliance behavior questioned, 153 reporting of "extra income" and claiming of deductions, were influenced by taxpayers' perceptions of justice if they identified themselves as part of the Australian community. 154 Overall, the Australian research suggests the possibility that, for individuals, at least with those who identify with the country to which they pay taxes, tax collector efforts at procedural fairness may affect compliance. 155 Research on this issue with respect to IRS contacts of United States taxpayers would be helpful.
C. Tone of IRS Communications
As the Australian study on procedural fairness discussed above suggests, the tone of letters from a tax collector may affect compliance behavior.
156 "After the IRS sends the first contact letter, it often sends a second one that is more stern than the first. It goes out automatically and does not take into account any action a taxpayer may have taken in 155. The report on the study concluded, "[t]he present study yielded some, but largely patchy, evidence for the assumption that procedural justice principles in reminder letters improve levels of compliance with the reminders." Id.
156. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
response to the first letter." 157 Theoretically, stern letters may offend compliant taxpayers: Like [sic] in the United States, the only contact most Australians have with their tax collector comes when they transmit a return. What [Peter] Simpson [a "second commissioner" of the Australian Taxation Office] wants to change is the tone the government can project when a taxpayer who has been compliant for 30 years or more makes a mistake and gets a stern letter from the taxation office. "People are saying, 'we don't want to be treated like that,'" Simpson said. "We should be able to develop a rating system so that a computer spits out an appropriate letter."
158
The Australian study involving letters sent to taxpayers with rental property, discussed above, 159 suggests that there may be no single answer with respect to the best tone for communications from a tax collector. 160 In that study, some taxpayers were sent a "soft" letter, focusing on the helpfulness of the Australian Taxation Office, while others were sent a "hard" letter emphasizing the possibility of audit and sanction. 161 The mailings also differed in content. Among other variations, some letters included a rental property schedule to complete and return to the Australian Taxation Office and some contained a schedule that did not have to be returned, so as to see whether government oversight was a factor in increasing compliance. 161. Id. at 9-11.
The 'soft' letters began with the sentence 'At the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) we are committed to helping taxpayers to correctly prepare their income tax returns'. The emphasis in these letters was on the role of the Tax Office as being informative and helpful. There was no mention of penalties or audit action. The 'hard' letters began with 'Over the past few years the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has conducted an extensive review program which has enabled us to collect and analyse rental property income and deductions data. The program has resulted in a substantial number of adjustments to rental property claims.' These letters emphasised that taxpayers could be selected for audit action, and that penalties for non-compliance could be imposed.
Id. at 10.
The letters were sent in June 2000 to a group of taxpayers that had been sent a schedule to complete in previous years because their compliance appeared questionable and a group that had not previously been sent the schedule. Id. at 9, 11. 162. Id. at 22.
The study found that taxpayers in the group that was sent a schedule to complete and return claimed fewer deductions than the controls. 163 By contrast, the tone of the letter generally made little difference. 164 However, the study found an interesting interaction that was "marginally significant." 165 For taxpayers who had been sent a schedule to complete in a prior year because they were deemed at risk for noncompliance, the hard letter resulted in fewer claimed rental deductions than the soft letter when the schedule had to be returned. 166 Yet, for that group of taxpayers, when the schedule did not have to be returned, the reverse was true: Those who received the soft letter claimed fewer rental deductions than those receiving the hard letter. 167 The experimenters suggest that either (1) the hard letter was more consistent with the requirement of returning the schedule and a soft letter is more consistent with not requiring the schedule to be returned or (2) when taxpayers felt threatened illegitimately, they claimed more deductions when they felt that they were not under scrutiny. 168 Thus, the Australian study suggests that tone may not matter or that it may be best for a tax collection agency to adopt a tone suited to the relevant context. The idea that softness on the part of a tax collection agency may impede collection in contexts in which taxpayers are likely to resist collection is intuitively plausible. For example, the failure to pay over "trust fund" taxes (withheld by third party payors and owed to the IRS 169 ) is a large and growing problem.
170
Often it is failing 163 . Id. at 23. This was true whether they had received a schedule in a prior year or no, that is, it was true for both the "at risk" group and the other group. Id. 164. Id. at 19, 26. The authors state that the distinction in the tone of the letters that were intended to be "hard" and those intended to be "soft" might not have been as clear as intended. Id. at 26. They planned to pretest letters in the next phase of the study. Id.
165. It was significant at p = .067. . It is not clear whether the amounts reported by the GAO reflect possible assertion of the 100% penalty under I.R.C. § 6672 with respect to multiple responsible persons. If the amounts include multiple assertions of the penalty, that would inflate amounts apparently owed because it is the IRS's policy to collect no more than the amount of the delinquent employment taxes. See I.R.M. 1.2.1.5.14, P-5-60 (02-02-1993); see also Sixth Circuit businesses that do not pay over the taxes, essentially embezzling them as a way to forestall closing down.
171
The unpaid taxes and penalties quickly snowball, compounding the tax liability. 172 Yet, the IRS's initial notice in a case involving a failure to pay "trust fund" taxes simply asks for an explanation for the delinquency. hen confronted with a choice between paying necessary operating expenses or depositing employment taxes, struggling businesses may opt to pay business expenses instead of taxes."); ABA Commission Report, supra note 3, at 367 ("It is tempting for the business owner in such desperate straits to view employee tax withholdings as an interest-free loan that will be paid back once business turns around."); Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978) ("the funds accumulated during the quarter can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors."); cf. Guttman, supra note 4, at 37 ("Much of the $280 billion [in IRS accounts receivable] is uncollectible because the taxpayers are in bankruptcy and the IRS is unlikely to collect the funds.").
Small businesses are those that experience a quarterly accumulation of funds:
Employers with the smallest employment tax liabilities pay on a quarterly basis; those with the largest liabilities pay the next banking day; and those with intermediate-sized liabilities pay on a monthly or more frequent basis. Generally, small businesses would tend to be heavily concentrated in the employment tax deposit categories calling for less frequent payments.
TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 2. In 2000, 19% of employers owed employment taxes quarterly, 52% owed them monthly, and 29% owed the taxes more frequently than monthly. Id. at 11 tbl. 1. In 2000, quarterly payments were required for those who owe less than $1,000 in employment taxes each quarter, monthly payments were required for those who owe between $1,000 and $50,000 annually, and payments were due more frequently and depending on the frequency of payments to employees, for other employers. Id. at 11. However, beginning January 1, 2001, the threshold for quarterly payments was raised from under $1,000 per quarter to under $2,500 per quarter. Id. at 11-12. That stood to increase the portion of employers making quarterly payments to approximately 37%. Id. at 12.
172. See TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 1-2 (discussing the problems that compounding tax liabilities pose to businesses). There is a time-sensitive late payment penalty, I.R.C. § 6651, a failure to deposit penalty, id. § 6656, and interest runs from the day the payment was due, id. § 6601(a). Payment ends this cycle but may be impossible for a failing business. This reality increases that the pressure on the IRS to act as promptly as possible but also places it in an extremely difficult situation politically.
173. TAX ADMINISTRATION: EMPLOYMENT TAX, supra note 170, at 15-16. 174. Id. at 4. Currently, the IRS is very dependent on employer filing of quarterly returns to spot noncompliance: "Although employment taxes for many employers must be paid throughout a IRS may benefit from taking a sterner approach sooner, at least in some cases.
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IV. CONCLUSION RRA '98 focused primarily on service and procedural reform, not compliance. Not surprisingly, the mandates of the legislation resulted in a shift of IRS resources from enforcement to service. 177 The data included in Part I of this article showed a decline in enforcement activity following passage of RRA '98. However, more important for overall calendar quarter, IRS' ability to determine whether employers have paid as frequently as required and in the amounts required is dependent on employers filing the Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return (Form 941 return)" because the IRS matches its deposit records with the information reported on the return. Id. at 2. An employer's failure to file a Form 941 significantly delays the IRS's initial contact, extending it from on average 5 weeks after the delinquency arises to approximately 14-28 weeks after the delinquency, with the variation due to the fact that the IRS's workload varies during the year. Id. The increase over the 5-week turn-around time is because the IRS processes filed returns first. Id. at 3. Therefore, the IRS may take longer to pursue those least inclined to pay the overdue taxes.
175. "The payment of employment taxes accounts for over $500 billion of the federal budget and is a large part of our voluntary tax system." DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FACING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 2001, available at http://www.treas.gov/tigta/armey-fy01-challenges.pdf (last visited September 16, 2003). Employment taxes comprise about a third of total tax collections. MANAGEMENT ADVISORY REPORT: COMPLIANCE, supra note 67, at 12.
176. It may also help for the IRS to increase the speed of enforcement when employer payments are late. The ABA Commission on Taxpayer Compliance recommended this in 1988. See ABA Commission Report, supra note 3, at 332, 368 (recommending early enforcement methods in order to reinforce compliance). Admittedly, this is very hard-perhaps politically impossible in the current climate-if collecting the taxes will shut down the business. "There is a tendency for the media to depict the Service in such cases as somehow victimizing the business and causing it to fail. But, in fact, the business had already failed; the theft of employee withholdings only postpones the day of reckoning, at substantial cost to the public treasury." Id. at 367. To collect taxes, the IRS cannot be the creditor exerting the least pressure on the business. James Andreoni has argued that "[t]ax evasion . . . may be a high-risk substitute for a loan." James Andreoni, The IRS as Loan Shark: Tax Compliance with Borrowing Constraints, 49 J. PUB. ECON. 35, 36 (1992) . However, if the IRS poses a toothless threat, the risk is not high at all. Faster action could prompt failing businesses to take more appropriate actions, such as cutting expenses. Cf. ABA Commission Report, supra note 3, at 367 ("Noncompliant taxpayers are usually failing businesses that cannot obtain credit and are unwilling to make hard business decisions such as cutting expenses, laying off workers, or declaring bankruptcy."). A general education campaign about the teeth in employment tax enforcement might also discourage using the IRS as an involuntary lender.
Another possible way to increase compliance with respect to the payment of trust fund taxes would be for Congress to require more frequent employment tax payments, particularly for small or start-up businesses. Of course, increasing the frequency of payments also increases compliance costs, which can be a particular hardship for these businesses. revenue than the direct effect of enforcement activity on enforcement revenue is the effect, if any, on voluntary compliance. 178 The data in Part I show that total federal revenue steadily increased between 1997 and 2001 179 and outpaced inflation. 180 However, those figures do not show what portion of taxes due actually were collected. If taxes due increased at a greater rate than taxes collected, then compliance rates have declined. Once the results of the new National Research Program are analyzed, 181 there will be current data on voluntary compliance that can be compared to the data from 1988, the last TCMP, the source of the estimate of an 83% overall rate of voluntary compliance.
In the meantime, there is some-perhaps limited-cause for concern. First, the General Accounting Office reported that between 1996 and 2001, "the number of apparent individual nonfilers increased about three and one-half times faster than the individual tax filing population." 182 Yet, other data show that rates of timely filing by individuals increased steadily between 1996 and 2000. 183 Second, the IRS Oversight Board conducted a survey in August 2001 that contained two questions from a 1999 IRS survey and three new questions. One of the repeated questions was "how much, if any, do you think is an acceptable amount to cheat on your income taxes?" In 1999, 87% responded "not at all" while in 2001, only 76% chose that answer. 184 The importance of these results should not be exaggerated, 185 but they are consistent with a possible relationship between decreased enforcement and a weaker normative commitment to tax compliance.
Unfortunately, the media focus on horror stories and the need to "reform" the IRS may suggest to taxpayers that IRS personnel have found that they need to "abuse" taxpayers in order to collect from them. This may tend to suggest that noncompliance is rampant, which, in turn, may tend to undermine normative commitments to compliance. 186 The Congressionally declared need for reform also may breed fear and mistrust of the IRS. 187 Will the reformed IRS increase the rate of voluntary compliance? Thus far, published studies on the link between tax collector friendliness and compliance have not focused on the effects of RRA '98. The available empirical evidence discussed above does not tend to support a connection between service to taxpayers and compliance. 188 
